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I. INTRODUCTION
The business risk exclusion was first introduced as a provision
in standard form comprehensive general liability (CGL) policies in
1966. This provision in 1966 form policies was intended to exclude
coverage for claims arising from inferior workmanship by the
policyholder or its employees during the course of performing
1
terms of a contract. A workable construct of the provision,
however, was not readily available until 1971 when Professor Roger
C. Henderson clearly articulated the business risk doctrine—a
doctrine that more fully explained the public policy purposes
2
behind the business risk exclusion.
After Henderson’s
explanation, courts began to more consistently rely on the business
risk exclusion to support insurer decisions to deny coverage for
3
property damage or personal injury caused by faulty workmanship.
With some exceptions, this trend towards reliance on the
business risk doctrine to exclude most claims arising from faulty
workmanship endured in Minnesota courtrooms until the recent
Minnesota Supreme Court decision of Thommes v. Milwaukee Mutual
4
Insurance Co. The Thommes court appears to have concluded that
business risk exclusions found in CGL policies do not preclude
coverage for an insured in certain cases involving the infliction of
damage on a third party. After Thommes, if an insured causes
damage to a third party, or if the damage is caused by an action for
which a party contracted, a policyholder’s counsel will undoubtedly
argue that there is support for a broad reading of the business risk
exclusion. However, given the strength of the dissent in Thommes, it
may yet become an anomalous decision that is ultimately
distinguished by Minnesota courts in future opinions.
This article will first examine the role the Thommes decision
plays in the development of the business risk doctrine in
Minnesota. Second, this article will detail the origin of the business
1. Roger C. Henderson, Insurance Protection for Products Liability and Completed
Operations – What Every Lawyer Should Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 438-46 (1971).
2. Id.
3. James Duffy O’Connor, What Every Construction Lawyer Should Know About
CGL Coverage for Defective Construction, 21 CONSTR. L. 15, 16 (2001).
4. 641 N.W.2d 877 (Minn. 2002). Prior to Thommes, the Minnesota Court of
Appeals appeared to signal some trend away from a broad application of the
business risk doctrine by its decision in O’Shaughnessy v. Smuckler Corp., 543
N.W.2d 99, 103-04 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Gordon v.
Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W.2d 393, 401-02 (Minn. 2002).
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5

risk doctrine, the development of the Minnesota courts’ use of the
6
business risk doctrine prior to Thommes, and the procedural
7
posture of Thommes. This article will then offer an analysis of
Thommes, discussing how Thommes signals an evolution in position
by the Minnesota courts that, while recognizing the possibility this
8
evolution will reach a quick end. Finally, this article will offer
considerations for insurance counsel regardless of whether
9
Thommes is an evolution or a short-lived revolution.
II. HISTORY OF THE BUSINESS RISK DOCTRINE
CGL policies typically exclude coverage for defective
10
performance of a contractual obligation. The typical CGL policy
accomplishes this intent through an exclusion known as a “business
risk exclusion” or “own work” exclusion. The standard form policy
provides that liability insurance does not cover:
That particular part of real property on which you or
any contractors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations if the [third party’s
property damage claim] arises out of those operations or
That particular part of any property that must be
restored, repaired or replaced because “your work” was
incorrectly performed on it . . . .
“Property damage” to “your work” arising out of it or
any part of it and included in the [complete operations
hazard coverage] . . . .
[Property damage claims] arising out of:
(1) A defect, deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous
condition in “your product” or “your work” or
(2) A delay or failure by you or anyone acting on your
behalf to perform a contract or agreement in accordance
with its terms.
This exclusion does not apply to the loss of use of other
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.
7. See infra Part IV.
8. See infra Part V.
9. Id.
10. A CGL policy “is a standardized liability policy promulgated by a group of
organizations including the United States’ leading insurance companies.” Laurie
Vasichek, Note, Liability Coverage for “Damages Because of Property Damage” Under the
Comprehensive General Liability Policy, 68 M INN. L. REV. 795, 798 (1984).
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property arising out of sudden and accidental physical
injury to “your product” or “your work” after it has been
put to its intended use.
Damages claimed for any loss, cost or expense insured
by you or others for the loss of use, withdrawal, recall,
inspection, repair, replacement, adjustment, removal or
disposal of
(1) “your product”
(2) “your work” or
(3) “impaired property”
if such product, work, or property is withdrawn or recalled
from the market or from use by any person or
organization because of a known or suspected defect,
11
deficiency, inadequacy or dangerous condition in it.
The business risk doctrine, which describes the public policy
behind the business risk exclusions found in standard form CGL
policies, is derived from the fundamental principle of insurance
law that insurers should not be held liable for risks within the direct
12
control of the insured. Described in more detail:
The risk intended to be insured is the possibility that the
goods, products or work of the insured, once relinquished
or completed, will cause bodily injury or damage to
property other than to the product or completed work
itself, and for which the insured may be found liable. The
insured, as a source of goods or services, may be liable as a
matter of contract law to make good on products or work
which is defective or otherwise unsuitable because it is
lacking in some capacity. This may even extend to an
obligation to completely replace or rebuild the deficient
product or work. This liability, however, is not what the
11. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS § T4.2
(1994) [hereinafter STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS] (quoting
INSURANCE SERVICE OFFICE, COMMERCIAL GENERAL LIABILITY FORM CG-00-01-11-88
(1988), reprinted in ALLIANCE OF AMERICAN INSURERS, POLICY KIT FOR STUDENTS OF
INSURANCE 186-87 (1990) (paragraph labels omitted).
12. See generally Henderson, supra note 1. Indeed, the mention of the
business risk doctrine was surprisingly absent from reported cases from the time it
was introduced into products hazards and completed operations policies in 1966,
until it was plainly articulated in a Nebraska Law Review article written by Professor
Roger C. Henderson in 1971. Id. Professor Henderson is generally attributed with
first articulating the business risk doctrine. JEFFREY W. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DISPUTES § 14.13 (2d ed. 2001) [hereinafter STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE
CONTRACT DISPUTES].
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coverages in question are designed to protect against.
The coverage is for tort liability for physical damages to
others and not for contractual liability of the insured for
economic loss because the product or completed work
is
13
not that for which the damaged person bargained.
The business risk exclusion is crafted to “limit the CGL to
providing coverage for ‘tort liability for physical damages to others
and not for contractual liability of the insured for economic loss
because the product or completed work is not that for which the
14
damaged person bargained.’”
The “exclusion resists any
policyholder tendency toward the moral hazard or adverse
selection of shoddy work by forcing the policyholder to internalize
15
the costs of unsatisfactory operations.” Courts looking to apply
the exclusion, as a result, must examine the nature of the
complaint to determine whether it arose from tort or from
16
contractual obligation.
In 1979, the Supreme Court of New Jersey was one of the first
courts to examine and openly endorse the business risk doctrine in
17
Weedo v. Stone-E-Brick, Inc. Facing a claim by a policyholder for
coverage caused by faulty stucco, the court construed the business
risk exclusion found in the CGL policy to unambiguously exclude
coverage for faulty workmanship where the damages were limited
to the cost of correcting the work itself (i.e., cracks and other signs
18
of faulty workmanship in stucco masonry). In so holding, the
13. O’Connor, supra note 3, at 15 (quoting Roger C. Henderson, Insurance
Protection for Products Liability and Completed Operations -- What Every Lawyer Should
Know, 50 NEB. L. REV. 415, 441 (1970)).
14. STEMPEL, LAW OF INSURANCE CONTRACT DISPUTES, supra note 12, at §
14.13(a) (quoting Henderson, supra note 1, at 441).
15. STEMPEL, INTERPRETATION OF INSURANCE CONTRACTS, supra note 11, at §
T4.2.
16. Id.
17. 405 A.2d 788 (N.J. 1979). Weedo involved two consolidated claims against
the same insured.
Both claims involved the construction of the same
comprehensive general liability provisions of a policy issued to a masonry
contracting insured. Id. at 789.
18. Id. Weedo alleged, inter alia, that:
[A]s a result of the defective and unworkmanlike manner in which the
defendants applied the said stucco, plaintiffs were compelled to and
did cause the defects existing therein to be remedied, where possible,
and the omissions to be supplied, and, in general, were compelled to
and did furnish all the work, labor, services and materials necessary to
complete the application of the said stucco . . . .
Id.
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court found the risk of defective construction was not intended to
19
be covered in a CGL policy.
A number of jurisdictions have since joined the Weedo court,
invoking the business risk doctrine and its theoretical
underpinnings. Among the jurisdictions applying the business risk
20
21
doctrine to exclude coverage include: Colorado, Delaware,
22
23
24
25
26
Florida, Indiana, Maine, North Carolina, North Dakota,
The second claimants, the Gellas, sued their general contractor for alleged defects
with roofing and gutter work performed by Stone-E-Brick pursuant to a
subcontract. The general contractor sought indemnification from Stone-E-Brick,
alleging that plaintiffs’ damages were due to Stone-E-Brick’s “faulty workmanship,
materials, or construction.” Id.
19. Id. at 791. The court stated:
Unlike business risks . . . where the tradesman commonly absorbs the
cost attendant upon the repair of his faulty work, the accidental injury
to property or persons substantially caused by his unworkmanlike
performance exposes the contractor to almost limitless liabilities.
While it may be true that the same neglectful craftsmanship can be the
cause of both a business expense of repair and a loss represented by
damage to persons and property, the two consequences are vastly
different in relation to sharing the cost of such risks as a matter of
insurance underwriting.
Id.
The court further explained:
When a craftsman applies stucco to an exterior wall of a home in a
faulty manner and discoloration, peeling and chipping result, the
poorly-performed work will perforce have to be replaced or repaired by
the tradesman or by a surety. On the other hand, should the stucco
peel and fall from the wall, and thereby cause injury to the homeowner
or his neighbor standing below or to a passing automobile, an
occurrence of harm arises which is the proper subject of risk-sharing as
provided by the type of policy before us in this case.
Id. at 791-92.
20. Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888 F. Supp. 1069, 1073
(D.Colo. 1994) (applying Colorado law, the district court held that exclusions
expressly precluded coverage for insured’s faulty workmanship and defective
performance).
21. Vari Builders, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 523 A.2d 549, 552
(Del. Super. Ct. 1986) (finding business policy exclusion unambiguous, and
excluding coverage).
22. Tucker Constr. Co. v. Mich. Mut. Ins. Co., 423 So.2d 525, 528 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1982) (excluding coverage for property damage where the floor of a
restaurant constructed by contractor settled).
23. Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. 1980) (excluding
coverage for defective workmanship where policy language unambiguously
excluded business risks).
24. Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 386 (Me. 1989) (holding that
exclusions unambiguously precluded coverage for business risk that insured
contractor’s product or completed work was substandard).
25. Wm. C. Vick Constr. Co. v. Penn. Nat’l Mut. Cas. Ins. Co., 52 F. Supp.2d
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29

Oklahoma, Tennessee, and West Virginia. For example, in
holding that the insurer maintained no liability for the business
risk exclusion precluding payment for damages due to
workmanship, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that “the
injury to products or work exclusion is intended to exclude
insurance for damage to the insured’s product or work, but not for
30
damage caused by the insured’s product or work.” Thus, the
exclusion does not apply where the product or work causes damage
to other persons or property.
As more courts expressly endorsed the business risk doctrine,
it became a more efficient and effective means by which an insurer
31
could deny coverage of a claim. Indeed, from the perspective of
some policyholders, the business risk doctrine had grown so
powerful for insurers that it supported a denial of coverage even
when the doctrine’s application was contradicted by the policy’s
32
express language. For example, the policy provision at issue in
Baylock & Brown Construction, Inc. v. AIU Insurance Co. expressly
defined property damage as including:
(1) physical injury to or destruction of tangible property
that occurs during the policy period, including the loss of
569, 592 (E.D.N.C. 1999) (finding that faulty workmanship did not constitute
property damage under CGL policies). See also W. World Ins. Co. v. Carrington,
369 S.E.2d 128 (N.C. Ct. App. 1988); Barbee v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 408 S.E.2d
840 (N.C. 1991).
26. Fisher v. Am. Family Mut. Ins. Co., 579 N.W.2d 599, 605-06 (N.D. 1998)
(finding that the injury to products or work exclusion precludes coverage for
economic loss sustained by the insured due to repairing or replacing its own
defective work or products).
27. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861 F.2d 250,
253 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that a CGL
policy does not extend to ordinary business risks and excluding coverage for
property damage to insured’s products and work).
28. Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591 S.W.2d 760,
763 (Tenn. 1979) (relying upon Weedo and holding that no coverage existed for a
breach of contract action grounded upon faulty workmanship or materials).
29. Erie Ins. Prop. & Cas. Co. v. Pioneer Home Improvement, Inc., 526 S.E.2d
28, 33-34 (W. Va. 1999) (finding policy language unambiguous and holding that
policy precluded coverage for workmanship).
30. Fisher, 579 N.W.2d at 605 (emphasis added).
31. See, e.g., Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Pac. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 861
F.2d 250, 253 (10th Cir. 1988); Bangert Bros. Constr. Co. v. Americas Ins. Co., 888
F. Supp. 1069, 1073 (D.Colo. 1994); Ind. Ins. Co. v. DeZutti, 408 N.E.2d 1275,
1279 (Ind. 1980); Peerless Ins. Co. v. Brennon, 564 A.2d 383, 386 (Me. 1989);
Fisher, 579 N.W.2d at 605; Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co.,
591 S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tenn. 1979).
32. O’Connor, supra note 3, at 15-16.
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the use thereof at any time resulting therefrom, or (2) loss
of the use of tangible property which has not been
physically injured or destroyed provided such loss of33 use is
caused by an occurrence during the policy period.
Nonetheless, the court denied coverage, citing the business risk
34
doctrine.
III. THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS RISK DOCTRINE IN
MINNESOTA
The Minnesota Supreme Court first expressly endorsed the
business risk doctrine in Bor-Son Building Corp. v. Employers
35
Commercial Union Insurance Co. of America. In doing so, the court
turned to the Weedo opinion to support its broad finding that no
insurance coverage existed for a general contractor whose liability
36
arises from faulty workmanship and materials.
The court
concluded, “[w]e are convinced that the standard comprehensive
general liability policy does not provide coverage to an insuredcontractor for a breach of contract action grounded upon faulty
workmanship or materials, where the damages claimed are the cost
37
of correcting the work itself.” The court subsequently affirmed its
Bor-Son holding in Knutson Construction Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
38
Insurance Co.
A number of courts refused to follow the breadth of the Bor33. 796 S.W.2d 146, 148 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
34. Id. at 153. In an examination by the court of the conflicting positions of
the plain language of the contract versus the business risk doctrine, the court
found “coverage for property damage provided by the standard [CGL] policy
[did] not extend coverage to an insured-contractor for a breach of contract
action.” Id. See also Vernon Williams & Son Constr., Inc. v. Cont’l Ins. Co., 591
S.W.2d 760, 763 (Tenn. 1979) (denying coverage on a similar basis).
35. 323 N.W.2d 58 (Minn. 1982). Bor-Son involved two suits that alleged that
water leakage in newly constructed high-rise apartment complexes were due to
defects caused by the use of faulty materials and workmanship. Id. at 60.
36. Id. at 63-64. The court found that all of the damages claimed by the
building owner arose out of Bor-Son’s breach of contract, and it reasoned that the
damages were a result of faulty workmanship in the performance of the contracts.
Id. at 63. The court then concluded that “[t]his liability on the part of the
contractor is not within the coverage of the contractor’s general liability policy.”
Id.
37. Id. (quoting Vernon Williams, 591 S.W.2d at 765).
38. 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986). In Knutson, the court considered the
Weedo decision but also relied upon the Bor-Son decision. Id. The court
determined that building damage caused by a general contractor’s breach of
contract duty due to faulty workmanship or use of defective materials was a
business risk and was excluded from insurance coverage. Id.
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39

Son opinion.
Some courts refused to follow Bor-Son without
comment, whereas others expressly criticized the reasoning used by
40
the Minnesota court. In Fireguard Sprinkler System Inc. v. Scottsdale
Insurance Co., the court openly criticized the Minnesota court’s
logic, indicating that because “a general contractor may have little
or no effective control over the manner in which subcontractors
perform work, [therefore the court finds] unpersuasive the
argument that because the prime contractor’s control makes the
work of a subcontractor a contractual business risk, the prime
contractor should not be able to obtain insurance against the
41
risk.” Fireguard acknowledged, however, that the Bor-Son analysis
may be properly limited to general contractor-subcontractor
42
relationships.
Perhaps in response to the growing number of decisions
critical of the Bor-Son analysis, the Minnesota Court of Appeals
refused to follow Bor-Son in its 1996 decision of O’Shaughnessy v.
43
Smuckler Corp. In that case, the court limited the Bor-Son and
Knutson rulings to CGL policies patterned after the unendorsed
44
1973 ISO CGL form. The court stated that the post-1986 policy
expressly covered insured contractors for defective construction
45
property damage. As a result, the court held that the business risk
doctrine did not preclude coverage for damages arising out of the
46
defective work of a subcontractor. The Minnesota Supreme Court
39. See, e.g., Fireguard Sprinkler Sys. Inc. v. Scottsdale Ins. Co. 864 F.2d 648
(9th Cir. 1988); Md. Cas. Co. v. Reeder, 221 Cal.App.3d 961, 973-74 (1990);
Southwest La. Grain, Inc. v. Howard A. Duncan, Inc., 438 So.2d 1224 (La. Ct. App.
1993); Corner Constr. Co. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 638 N.W.2d 887, 89294 (S.D. 2002); Mid-United Contractors, Inc. v. Providence Lloyds Ins. Co., 754
S.W.2d 824 (Tex. Ct. App. 1988).
40. See, e.g., Fireguard, 864 F.2d at 653-54 (finding that Bor-Son’s explanation
ignored the careful drafting of the policy); Green Constr. Co. v. Nat’l Union Fire
Ins. Co., 771 F. Supp. 1000, 1006 (W.D.Mo. 1991); Harbor Ins. Co. v. Tishman
Constr. Co., 578 N.E.2d. 1197, 1201 (Ill. Ct. App. 1991).
41. 864 F.2d at 653-54.
42. Id. (citing Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins., 323
N.W.2d 58, 63-64 (Minn. 1982)).
43. 543 N.W.2d 99, 104-05 (Minn. Ct. App. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by
Gordon v. Microsoft Corp., 645 N.W. 2d 393, 401-02 (Minn. 2002).
44. Id. at 103-05.
45. Id. at 104-05. The 1986 exception states, however, that the exclusion does
not apply if the damaged work or the work out of which the damage arises was
preformed on ‘your behalf’ by a subcontractor. Thus, the plain language of the
exception provides that damages to ‘your work’ is covered if the damage results
from the work performed by a subcontractor.” Id. at 104.
46. Id. at 104-05.
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denied review.
As a result of these mixed decisions, the Minnesota Supreme
Court’s interpretation of the business risk doctrine was convoluted.
The court broadly denied coverage for damage related to faulty
workmanship and materials in the early Minnesota cases of Bor-Son
47
and Knutson Construction.
Then, in an apparent progression
towards coverage, the court of appeals in O’Shaughnessy held that
the business risk doctrine did not preclude coverage for defective
48
construction in policies dated after 1986. In the midst of this
uncertainty, Thommes presented an opportunity for Minnesota
courts to further clarify their treatment of the business risk
doctrine.
IV. THE THOMMES DECISION
Dean Morlock, Charles Vig, and HHA Development, Inc.
49
owned a commercial development. John Krajewski and Donna
Krajewski (Morlock’s sister) owned property directly adjacent to
50
the development. In September 1996, Thommes & Thomas Land
Clearing (“Thommes”) entered into a contract with Richard
51
Knutson, Inc., to clear trees from the HHA development. While
describing the work that Thommes was to perform, Morlock
pointed out a tree which marked the property line up to which
52
Thommes was to clear. He told Thommes not to worry about
whether certain trees were on the development “because his sister
53
owned the [adjacent] property.” Morlock mistakenly instructed
Thommes to clear approximately one-half acre of the Krajewskis’
54
land without obtaining the consent of the property owners.
55
The Krajewskis filed an action against Thommes for damages.
Thommes tendered defense to its CGL insurer, Milwaukee Mutual

47. Bor-Son, 323 N.W.2d at 63; Knutson Constr. Co. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Ins. Co., 396 N.W.2d 229, 235 (Minn. 1986).
48. O’Shaughnessy, 543 N.W.2d at 102-05.
49. Thommes v. Milwaukee Ins. Co., 641 N.W.2d 877, 879 (Minn. 2002).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Thommes v. Milwaukee Mut. Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 155, 157 (Minn. Ct.
App. 2001).
53. Id.
54. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879. Thommes first learned of his mistaken
clearing of the Krajewskis’ land upon their bringing of an action against
Thommes. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.
55. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 157.
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56

Insurance Company. Milwaukee refused to defend and indemnify
57
Thommes. Milwaukee asserted that the damage on the Krajewski
property was not covered due to the business risk exclusions
58
contained in sections 2j(5) and 2j(6) of Thommes’ CGL policy.
Thommes sought a declaratory judgment that Milwaukee had a
59
duty to defend and indemnify Thommes under the policy. Each
party filed a motion for summary judgment, and the trial court
60
granted Milwaukee’s motion.
The Minnesota Court of Appeals reversed the district court
61
order and granted Thommes’ motion for summary judgment. In
reversing the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of
Milwaukee, the court of appeals began with the recognition that
exclusions 2j(5) and 2j(6) are business risk exclusions, designed to
exclude coverage for faulty workmanship within the insured’s
62
control. Implying that the policy exclusions were unambiguous,
the court found that “damage to third-party property caused by
appellant’s work is not excluded from coverage” by exclusions 2j(5)
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id. The relevant portions of Thommes’ CGL policy read:
I . Section I—Coverages
Coverage A. Bodily Injury and Property Damage Liability
1. Insuring Agreement
a. We will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of “bodily injury” or “property damage” to
which this insurance applies
****
2.
Exclusions
This insurance does not apply to:
****
j. Damage to property
“Property damage” to:
****
(5) That particular part of real property on which you or any
contractors or subcontractors working directly or indirectly on your
behalf are performing operations, if the “property damage” arises out
of those operations; or
(6) That particular part of any property that must be restored, repaired
or replaced because “your work” was incorrectly performed on it.
****
19. “Your work” means:
Work or operations performed by you or on your behalf * * * .
Id. 158.
59. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
60. Id.
61. Thommes, 622 N.W.2d at 160.
62. Id.
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64

and 2j(6). Milwaukee appealed.
The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeal’s
65
holding, finding that the Milwaukee policy provided coverage. In
so holding, the supreme court first turned to the basic rules of
66
insurance policy construction. The court examined the express
policy language to determine whether the policy unambiguously
67
covered damage to the Krajewskis’ property. As a threshold issue,
if the policy language was unambiguous, the court concluded it
68
had no need to invoke extrinsic evidence or public policy.
Exclusion 2j(5) provided that coverage did not exist for
“‘[p]roperty damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of real property
on which you [Thommes] or any contractors or subcontractors
working directly or indirectly on your [Thommes’s] behalf are
performing operations, if the ‘property damage’ arises out of those
69
operations.” The court held the policy language was ambiguous,
finding that the phrase “that particular part of real property on
which you . . . are performing operations” was susceptible to more
70
than one meaning. The court reasoned that because the phrase
was not defined, and the express language did not clearly signify
whether the land of a third party was covered, the exclusion was
71
ambiguous. With little explanation, the court appeared to further
endorse this conclusion by indicating “the underlying purpose of
CGL insurance” supported finding that the phrase was
72
ambiguous.
63. Id.
64. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 879.
65. Id. at 884.
66. Id. at 880. The Minnesota Supreme Court criticized the court of appeals
for its failure to properly apply the rules of construction. Id.
67. Id. at 882.
68. Id.
69. Id. (quoting the policy language).
70. Id. at 883.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 884. An insurer counsel might argue that this reasoning departs
from Minnesota contract law because courts should only look to the language
within the “four corners” of the contract in determining if there is an ambiguity.
See, e.g., In re Quinlan’s Estate, 233 Minn. 35, 35, 45 N.W.2d 807, 808 (1951)
(stating that “[t]he primary rule of construction is that the intent of the testatrix,
as expressed in the language of the will, is to be gathered from everything
contained within its four corners, as read in the light of the surrounding
circumstances”); Hutchinson Gas Co. v. Phoenix Indem. Co., 206 Minn. 257, 261,
288 N.W. 847, 850 (1939) (finding no ambiguity in the contract and holding “such
being the case, there is no room for construction even though the rule is that such
a contract should be construed most favorably to the indemnitee”); Oleson v.
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Exclusion 2j(6) provided that coverage did not exist for
“‘property damage’ to . . . [t]hat particular part of any property
that must be restored, repaired or replaced because ‘your
[Thommes’s] work’ was incorrectly performed on it,” where “your
[Thommes’s] work” includes “work or operations performed by
73
you [Thommes] or on your [Thommes’s] behalf.” The court
concluded that this exclusion was ambiguous because it was unclear
whether it applied only to work performed in a faulty or defective
manner, and whether work was “incorrectly performed” if it was
74
completed in the right manner but on the wrong property.
75
Invoking contra proferentem the court reasoned that the exclusion
applied only to work done in a faulty or defective manner; thus the
property damage was covered because it was done in the right
76
manner, just on the wrong property.
After determining that the CGL exclusions were ambiguous,
the court then turned to the business risk doctrine and recognized
“that the underlying purpose of CGL insurance is to provide
coverage for the risk of tort liability to third parties, as opposed to
77
risks that arise as a matter of contract law.” The court’s
determination that the exclusions did not clearly demonstrate
intent to exclude the risk of liability for damage to third parties’
property supported its decision to enforce the coverage provisions
78
of the policy.
Justice Stringer, joined by Chief Justice Blatz and Justice Paul
Anderson, dissented, indicating disagreement with the
characterization of the exclusions as ambiguous in nature; he
believed the two provisions clearly and unambiguously excluded

Bergwell, 204 Minn. 450, 454, 283 N.W. 770, 773 (1939) (“We are not permitted to
so construe a contract as to avoid the chosen language used by the parties
provided such language ‘is plain and unambiguous.’”). In Thommes, the court
found two possible meanings of the policy exception, one derived from the plain
meaning, and the other derived from the business risk doctrine. 641 N.W.2d at
879-80.
73. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 883.
74. Id.
75. Contra proferentem is a commonly used doctrine by which ambiguities in a
document are to be construed unfavorably towards the drafter or in favor of
coverage. General Mills, Inc. v. Gold Medal Ins. Co., 622 N.W.2d 147, 151 (Minn.
Ct. App. 2001), review denied (Minn. Apr. 17, 2001) (citing BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY
328 (7th ed. 1999)).
76. Thommes, 641 N.W.2d at 880.
77. Id. at 884.
78. Id.
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79

the Krajewskis’ property damage from coverage. Justice Stringer
suggested the majority distorted the policy language, and its
conclusion was “absurd and inconsistent with our long-standing
principle that we construe contracts to avoid absurd or unjust
80
results, where reasonably possible.” Justice Stringer accused the
majority of distorting the policy language in exclusion 2j(5) of the
policy by limiting the definition of “real property on which you . . .
are performing operations” to that on which Thommes contracted
to work. He stated that such a distortion “does not support a
conclusion of ambiguity that justifies ignoring the 2j(5)
81
exclusion.” Justice Stringer would have also applied the 2j(6)
exclusion, noting that “the insurance policy does not provide
coverage for claims for work incorrectly performed—and what
could be more incorrect than performing the work on the wrong
82
property?”
V. A CONTINUING EVOLUTION OR MERELY A REVOLUTION?
The final impact of Thommes on the status of the business risk
doctrine in Minnesota remains unclear. Given the mixed history of
the doctrine and the strength of the dissent, it is possible that
Thommes may be viewed as an anomaly that is readily distinguished
on its facts. On the other hand, Thommes could be viewed as a sign
of a further evolution toward a more limited view of the business
risk doctrine in Minnesota.
Most likely, the Thommes decision reflects a more balanced
approach to judicial treatment of the business risk doctrine in
Minnesota. Traditionally, courts have used the business risk
doctrine to support a finding that CGL policies do not provide
coverage for property damage or for personal injury caused by the

79. Id. (Stringer, J., dissenting):
On the contrary, the plain meaning of the provisions clearly provide
for an exclusion from coverage . . . . The plain meaning is nothing
more or nothing less than what the words say—here the exclusion
applies because Thommes was “performing operations” on the
Krajewskis’ property by cleaning and grubbing their land, and damage
to the Krajewskis’ trees, shrubs, and grass falls squarely within the
reference to “property damage.”
Id.
80.
81.
82.

Id. at 884-85.
Id. at 884.
Id. at 885.
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83

insured contractor’s faulty workmanship. The typical analysis
asked whether the damage was caused by defective workmanship of
84
the insured contractor.
If the damage was caused by faulty
workmanship, coverage was excluded. If the damage was
attributable to some other cause (i.e. the use of faulty materials),
coverage might not have been excluded.
If Thommes is endorsed as an evolution of Minnesota law,
Minnesota courts will now ask an additional preliminary question:
was the damage incurred by a third party? If a court answers this
question affirmatively, it appears that it will probably find that the
CGL policy provides coverage, regardless of the cause of damage.
This analysis would be, of course, a shift towards an interpretation
of contracts to benefit those insureds who may have caused
personal injury or property damage to a third party,
notwithstanding the absence of a contractual relationship between
the third party and the insured. This assumes that the insured’s
acts would otherwise be covered because the insured acted
according to the conditions of the underlying contract.
Whether Thommes is ultimately judged to be an evolution or a
revolution, it is undeniable that counsel facing a business risk issue
must be prepared to address the impact of the decision. At a
minimum, insurance counsel must continue to consider whether
85
the damage resulted from the insured’s faulty workmanship.
Under Bor-Son, if the court found that the damage was caused by
faulty workmanship, it would most likely find that coverage was
86
excluded under a standard CGL policy. However, following
Thommes, practitioners should also consider the language and
purpose of the underlying contract between the insured and the
87
third party. If the purpose and scope of the underlying contract
for work is narrowly and precisely defined, and damage occurs
outside the scope of that contract, the insured may now be able to
88
successfully argue that coverage for such damage exists.
83. See supra Part II. (describing the historical underpinnings of the business
risk doctrine).
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., id. (noting that historically courts have been primarily concerned
with whether damage was a result of faulty workmanship).
86. Bor-Son Bldg. Corp. v. Employers Commercial Union Ins. Co., 323
N.W.2d 58, 63 (Minn. 1982).
87. For example, the purpose of the underlying contract in Thommes was to
clear land. 641 N.W.2d at 879.
88. Id. at 884 (“Construing the exclusion narrowly against the insurer, as we
must, we conclude that [the] exclusion . . . applies only to work performed in a

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

15

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 2
FINAL D OTSETH THOMMES.DOC

612

10/28/2002 10:57 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

Insurance counsel should also be prepared to address the
significance of who has incurred the damage. Indeed, Thommes
might be interpreted by policyholder’s counsel to support an
argument that the business risk doctrine does not apply to any
89
third party damage cases.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Thommes decision arrived at a time when Minnesota
courts’ application of the business risk exclusions found in
standard CGL policies to claims arising from faulty workmanship
seemed convoluted. At times, Minnesota courts had broadly
applied the business risk exclusions, denying coverage for damage
related to faulty workmanship. Later, Minnesota courts appeared
to retreat from this position, indicating that its earlier holdings
were limited. The Thommes decision may be considered an
evolution of Minnesota’s use of the business risk doctrine, an
attempt to clarify how Minnesota courts will apply the doctrine to
claims arising out of defective workmanship. On the other hand,
Thommes may only be a short-lived revolution, which will be quickly
distinguished by the Minnesota courts. Regardless of whether
Thommes is an evolution or a revolution, Thommes clarifies the
variables insurance counsel should consider when faced with a
business risk exclusion issue.

faulty or defective manner and thus, does not bar coverage of the damage to the
Krajewskis’ property.”).
89. See supra Part V.
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